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It: is generally found that powcr and prestige in small, tank-
%
oriented groups are unequally distributed, and these unequal distributions j 
or. power and prestige del־ermine inequalities in rates of participation, 
in the distribution of rewards and evaluations, and in the amount of 
influence inciv.bers hav? over decisions. In this paper we present a 
theory that accounts for the relation between power and prestige and 
these behaviors and we describe the results of an experimental test of 
part of that theory.
Using structured observation of experimental a ¿  hoc discussion groups, 
the members of which were presumed initially to be status equals, Bales 
and his associates (Bales, et a l ., 1951, Bales, 1953, Bales and Slater,
1955, and ll:inecke and Bales, 1953) found that marked inequalities 
develop over tir.n in the rate at which members are hbserved to initiate 
action« Further, they found that those who initiate action most frequently 
tend to be ranked highest on the criteria of "best ideas" and "guidance" 
and tend to receive actions from others at the highest rate. If we 
assuv.i’ (a) that a״ high ranking on "best ideas" reflects having bade a 
large number of positively evaluated contributions during the discussion,
(b) that a high ranking on "guidance" reflects, at the least, having 
been highly successful in influencing decisions, and (c) that a 
high rate of interaction initiated reflects a high number of socially*T-
distributed opportunities to initiate interaction, we can speculate that 
the following are tuue: over a period of time in taslc-orientcd groups, 
the iie:״.b׳'.־s on which begin as status equals, inequalities develop in th? 
rate ot which ::’.embers initiate action, in the rate at which members are
given the opportunity t:o initiate actinn, in the nnount of influence that 
memberr exercise, and the likelihood that contributions will be positively 
evaluated by other members; and all of these ?re positively correlated 
with one another.
Regularities similar to the above were found by Norfleet (1948) 
in "her examination of adult discussion groups which met together over a' 
period of three, weeks. Ratings, by t:'ne members, of those individuals 
seen as having contributed most to the "productivity" of the group, 
becane concentrated with a high degree of agreement, on a few individuals. 
Further, those who were rated as the best contributors also tended to be 
high on both initiation and receipt of interaction. Following the line 
of reasoning given above, we can speculate that through time those in­
dividuals v.iiose contributions were more positively evaluated were increas­
ingly given more opportunities to initiate action and, in fact, did 
initiate more action. I
A second group of studies has documented the relationship of the 
power and prestige order to expectations for performance on a group task. 
Harvey (1953) has reported that, among groups of adolescents uhere a power♦
and prestige order already existed, expectations for performance held by 
each individual for himself and by the group for each individual on a 
dart throwing task tended to coincide with the existing power and prestige 
order (that is, those rated higher in power and prestige were predicted 
to score higher than those lower in power and prestige). In a similar 
study, using boys attending a summer camp, Sherif, White, and Harvey 
(1.9 55) found tha evaluations of immediate past performance on a handball
throwi!1״ tas. k also tended t׳o I !)rr<־M .־!i:f:'v’iLh nn (•'.isting power and prestige 
order. Jn his clarsxc par tic: i pa¡’t cbsorva tion study of the Norton Street 
;;״ii[׳, Whyte (].9׳i3) asscrtcyl that power and prestige in the gang were a 
dircct function of the individuol* s ability to perform well in the 
activities valued by the group (such as fighting, bov/ling, or arguing), and 
that once a power and prestige order developed it tended to be self- 
mint•־! •ining in the sense that actual performance even on new activities 
was determined by the power and prestige order. It seems reasonable to 
assert, then, that, in v-iany settings, differential expectations for task 
performance are associated with the power and prestige order.
We believe that the relationship between power and prestige orderings 
and participation rates, distribution of rewards and evaluations5 and 
amount of influence that individuals possess is in fact due to a relation­
ship between expectations for task performance and these same behaviors.
We next present a set of axioms which specify this relationship.
The Theory
We will restrict our attention to a situation in which two or more 
individuals are engaged in the joint solution of some task, T. We assume 
that their efforts have only two outcomes ־־ success or failure -- and 
that the individuals in the group are. committed to successfully completing 
the tasl^. We assume further that there is some particular ability directly 
associated with the successful completion of T. We will speak of task 
ability by referring to the perforirance expectations associated with the 
ability. A performance expectation is an anticipation by a group member
of (־he: quality of hi¡״ own or so-'c ()!:her1? performance. We assume that
perfon.T’ner: e;:pccta tions c m  ha'׳c 1:\־o values, high (•¡•) and low (-). Thus,
i,
if ׳mi individual held high expectations for himself and low expectations, 
for another individual , he would anticipate that hip own performance would 
be of high or superior quality and that the other's performance would be 
of lov: or inferior quality.
We will analyze the interaction which occurs in the above situation 
with the following set of concepts. First, we define an a c tion opportunity 
as a socially distributed chance to perform (as when x is asked a question 
by y ) . An action opportunity may be a request for a particular kind of 
act by another, such as a request that he evaluate an idea, or it may be 
a non-specific request for whatever kind of act or acts the receiver deems 
appropriate. A performance output is a problem solving attempt by some 
group member (as when x presents an idea in a group discussion). A reward 
action is an action which communicates the acceptance or rejection of 
performance outputs. Reward actions may be thought of as communicated 
evaluations and, like־performance expectations, will have two values, 
positive (+) and negative (־).
Action opportunities, perfox־mance outputs, and reward actions are all 
observable behaviors. Two other major concepts employed are distinguished 
by being unobservable. The first is that of a uni t cvalua tion , a momentary
evaluation of a person or of a unit performance of a person. Unit
t
evaluations may be either positive (b) or negative (־). The second con­
cept is acceptance of influen c e , the change or formation of a unit
ova luaLio ;1 of a performsn׳-.־• output in r.׳spons;• to the unit «valuation
V
of sn!.v.. per forma ltc»: c.u>:pt«;: •>y ;• :'other. Those; unobservable con-
Copt» wilj operate with the concept of a porformaocf expectation as
i.X
hypothetical or explanatory concepts in the theory.
The first axiom of the system specifies two consequences of differences 
in performance expectations— that group members are more likely to give 
opportunities to perform to those who are expected to perform well, and 
that the performance output of a person for whom high expectations are held 
is more likely to be favorably received than one from a person for whom low 
expectations arc held regardless of the content of the performance output.
A xiom 1 (Inequality A x i o m ) , Suppose that expectations held for 
person p are greater than those held for person o. Then, (a) p is more 
likely than o to receive an action opportunity, (b) p's performance out- 
puts are more likely than those of o to be evaluated positively.
Axiom 2 specifies the consequences of expectation equalities for 
action opportunities and performance evaluations. Equalities are not 
treated 111 detail here and Axiom 2 is included for completeness.
Axiom. 2 (]•:quality Axiom) . Suppose that expectations held for p 
are the sarus as those held for o. Then, any individual when giving 
action opportunities and making performance evaluations will, in the 
absence of factors other than performance expectations, be indifferent 
between p and o.
Axiom 3 expresses the relationship between the two kinds of unit 
evaluations: those of persons and those of performances. The principle 
involved states that momentary evaluations of persons (such as when x 
s.'iys, "Y is right”) are determined by momentary evaluations of performance
output.׳; (such as when x sa>:•, "Th:!t suj'goRfcion is good") , and '
vice versa. In thf latter in•; tan со (evaluations of: persons determining 
cvaluatloii of perfornPneosp, the quality of performance is judged by 
reference fjrst to some quality of the person. For example, if p is 
more co:’pctent at the task than o, then о may at times reason that "p 
is probably right; hence his idea is probably a good one."
Axiom 3. Unit evaluations of persons occur if and only if unit evaluations 
of the performances of those persons occur.
Axiom fy expresses the commonsense relationship between receiving action 
opportunities and making performance outputs. It states simply that, when 
a person is asked to contribute to the completion of the task, he will 
make a contribution. This is undoubtedly too strong a statement of this 
relationship, but it will be. used as a first approximation.
Axiom h. If p is given an action opportunity specifying a performance 
output, he will accept it.
Axiom 5 is included as a more formal statement of the relationship 
between evaluations and rewards. We stated previously that reward actions 
are "communicated evaluations." However, evaluations per se are communicated*
only if acceptance or rejection of performance outputs occurs as a result 
of unit evaluations. V7e assume here that reward actions are given only 
as an expression of true evaluations of performance.
Axiom 5 . Reward actions occur if and only if unit evaluations of 
performances occur.
Some relationship exists between the values of unit evaluations of 
persons and performances and of reward actions. The simplest assumption 
will b o r i d e ,  namely, that for those unit evaluations and reward actions ׳ 
linked by Axioms 3 and 5, all three values will be the same.
Axiom 6. The vain•.•:; of .־! uni t (,•valuation of a person, unit evaluation 
of lrj.s performance, an«.! reward actions directed to hir! arc always identical.
The final axiom concerns the formation of performance expectations%,I
when group r.embers are ignorant of each other’s task ability. The 
process involved has been explicated in more detail in Berger, e_t al.
(1966). It suffices for our purposes here to state that performance 
expectations form as a generalization from unit evaluations of persons.
Thus, far example, from saying, "I was right and he was wrong," on some 
particular occasion, an individual may conclude, "I am better at this than 
he is." This is equivalent to saying that unit evaluations of persons 
are necessary, but not sufficient, for performance expectations to form.
Axiom 7 , If and only if p assigns unit evaluations to persons 
does the possibility exist for him to form performance expectations?
As examples of how the axioms can be used, we will derive from them 
two of the generalizations stated in the beginning of the paper. Ue 
first consider the differential rates of participation found by Bales and 
Norfleet. To explain this finding we derive the statement that if p is 
more competent than o then he will make more performance outputs than o.
*
It follows directly from the following two statements: assuming p more 
competent than o
1. p will be given more action opportunities than o. [part (a) of 
Axiom 1]
2. p will always accept thoee action opportunities specifying a 
performance, output. (Axiom 4]
Vie next consider the assertion that differences in power and 
prcsti?.c lead to differences in the distribution of rewards. The 
equivalent statement using the concepts of the theory is that if p is 
more competent than o then he will receive more positive reward actions
th.n о. VJo can derive il fro:»' t1'־c following three statements: assumingר>
p того competent than о
1. p's performances ore more likely to be positively evaluated.
[I’art (b) of A::iom 1 ]
2. Reward actions expressing positive evaluations are positive.
[Axiom 6]
3. Reward actions will occur if performance evaluations occur.
[Axiom f>]
The nature of the derivations will differ depending upon which 
process one wishes to focuss upon. For example, suppose for some 
reason, perhaps experimental control, that p and o's performances are 
equally likely to be positively evaluated. Then we could still derive 
the statement that p will recieve more positive reward actions by replacing 
statement 1 in che second derivation above with the statement that p 
will make more performance outputs. This illustrates that there are 
several processes involved in producing the inequalities we have discussed 
and one of the functions of an axiom system such as this one is to separately 
specify these processes.
The Experiment
V?e will present experimental evidence in support of the assertion 
that'the greater the expectations held for о relative to p, the more 
likely is p to accept influence from o. As indicated above, performance
*T.
expectations can influence acceptance of influence in several ways, all 
of which are consistent with the axioms. For example, one of the simpler 
processes is that those who are most competent, are given the most
o״־ I > •״
OppnVtuniL j.«'R 1:0 CXprOSS ;’?־!״• nr־i.' C’ va lua ton.s , honco exercise jnorc
influence. V?0 vjj.ll focus!; upon another proc.ess~~the direct, effect of 
perfoViiVince expectations upon acceptance of :influence. It will be assumed
* ,i
that, neither differential giving of action opportunities nor differential 
making of performance outputs arc contributing to the process and it 
will b o .asserted, based on part (b) of Axiom 1, that p's performances, 
compared to o's, are more likely to be re-evaluated positively the more 
competent lie is relative to o.
The separate examination of the various processes that lead to the 
one result of interest is made possible by the construction of a 
standardized experimental situation in which all of the concepts of the 
theory have been operationalized and in which we can control the occurrence 
of any one or more of the concepts. In the case being considered, we 
controlled the occurrence of both action opportunities and performance 
outputs, manipulated performance expectations, and observed acceptance 
of influence.
The experiment consisted of two parts called phase I and phase II.
Two subjects participated in each experiment. In phase I they were both 
publically given fictitious scores on a test which was purported to 
measure their ability at the phase II task. This was the manipulation 
of performance expectations. In phase II they were required on repeated 
occasions (i.e., trials) to select one of two alternatives as the correct 
answer to a word association problem. The selection of a correct answer 
had two stages. Every time a subject was presented with a set of 
alternatives, he first made a preliminary selection and exchanged
o _s
i i i i n ׳tion viith hi:; partn.er a:׳: to vhj\h nJ.tornnti.ve each initially 
selected. The subjects could not verbally communicate nor even see 
each other but indicated their choices to the experimenter end each other%>
tiring a system of lights and push-button switches. Following the initial 
choice, each m d e  a private final choice taking the information he had 
received from the other into account. The purpose of this initial choicc- 
final choice sequence was defined as seeing how we 1.1 they worked together 
'¡>r> n team"«, They were told, moreover, that their final decision would 
be evaluated in terms of a "team score." The team score was simply the 
sum of the number of "correct" final decisions which each made with no
record kept of the relative contribution of e a c h rr~:—
j===res?riteii?5^4ref1. The requirement that subjects irake a 
c o 1 זיג u ru'.c a ted initial choice is equivalent to their having been given a 
mandatory action opportunity, and the choice itself constitutes as 
performance output. Thus action opportunities could not be unequally 
distributed nor could a subject decline to make a performance output.
To create the possibility for each subject to accept influence from 
the other and to standardize conditions, the experimenter controlled the 
exchange of initial choice information. Except for three trials of the 
total, of twenty-five (6,13,20), the subjects were led to believe that 
they initially disagreed. They had to decide each time whether "he's 
right and I'm wrong," which would be a change of evaluation and hence 
acceptance of influence, or whether "I'm right and he's wrong," which 
would be non-acceptance of influence.
The ]׳hr.se J.l I.1־ sk nrol) 1׳.: ■r. c:o!<r.i.i*LC!d of sets of words .such as the 
one׳ shown below.
YESTERDAY*
( A )  ( 1 4 )
TA-XHT TU-SAK
Subjects were instructed that the non-English words in the bottom row wore 
phonetic, spellings from a language unknown to them but that one of the 
words had Lu^ . cia״.e meaning as the English word given. They were told that 
by comparing the sounds of the non-English words with the meaning of the 
English word they could decide which word was correct. The ability to 
do this was called ״Meaning Insight Ability." Loth the ability and the 
language, of course, were fictitious. Subjects were shown a total of twenty- 
five different ?ord sets.
Each words set was selected, on the basis of a pretest, so as to 
represent as ambiguous a choice as possible. Only those word sets which 
elicited selection of one alternative 40-607־ of the ti.ma when shown to ].00 
pretest subjects were used in the task sequence. The order of presentation 
of the .,ord sets was randomized.
*
The manipulation of competence at ״Meaning Insight," hence the 
manipulation of performance expectations, was accomplished in phase I 
by showing the subjects a series of twelve word sets very similar to those 
described above. In each of these word setetherole of the English and 






oecurrcnres and as being either superior or poor, so that each subject
was led to believe either that he vjas exceptionally good or exceptionally ■
Jt vas predicted that the rate of acceptance of influence would be 
greatest in condition (d), least in (a), and that conditions (b) and
(c) would have the same rate.
The subjects were 161 Stanford University undergraduates who 
volunteered from various university classes. They were paid $1.25 for 
participating. Forty-three were eliminated from the analysis for becoming 
suspicious of one or more of the deceptions in the experiment. The 
remaining subjects were distributed in conditions as follows:
bad, and either that his partner was exceptionally good or exceptionally
bad. Me nee, there were four performance expectation conditions
(a) high self, low other
(b) high self, high other
(c) low self, low other





Table 1 presents the mean proportion o f f i n a l  choices, for all trials,
where subjects in each condition declined to accept influence (i.e., their
\
final choice was the same as-their initial choice).
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Table 1 presents the mean proportion of final choices, for all trials, 
where subjects in each condition declined to accept influence (i.e., their 
final choice was the same as. their initial choice).
[Table 1 about here]
It is clear that the data confirm the order predicted by the theory and that 
those who were expected to perform relatively better decline to accept influence 
more.
The above ordering also holds true throughout the series of trials.
Chart 1, shown below, is a graph of the proportion of non-acceptance of in­
fluence for blocks of three trials.
[Chart 1 about here]
The rates for all conditions are constant, they never overlap (except, 
of course, for (b) and (c)], and the ordering is as predicted. It is especially 
interesting to note how similar conditions (b) and (c) are. The curves very 
clearly indicate that only relative, no absolute, performance expectations affect 
acceptance of influence.
Summary
We began this paper with some speculations from the literature that power 
and prestige orderings in small groups are related to participation rates, 
distributions of rewards and evaluations, and to exercise of influence. We 
formalized these speculations in a set of Axioms which describe the process of 
problem solving interaction in small groups. Experimental evidence was presented 
which confirms one derivation--that a person expected to perform well relative 
to another person will accept influence less than if expected to perform 
relatively poorly.
־ 21 ־
What remains to be done is to gather additional evidence for other 
derivations from the theory or for other statements in the theory. The 
experimental situation described can be easily modified to carry out such>
experiments. In addition to providing evidence for the theory, it is hoped 
that the experiments will lead to refinement of the theory and more precise 
statements of the Axioms.
Condition Proportion Number
high self, low other col־'-• 29
high self, high other .67 31
low self, low other .65 32
low self, high other .44 28
Table 1
Proportion of final choices where 






Chart 1. Proportion of non-acceptance of 
influence for blocks of three trials
